## 1NC

**Off**

**Liberal commercial peace is a mask for a cult of patriarchal violence**

**Neocleous 11** (Mark Neocleous, professor of the critique of the political economy (yes that is a thing) at Brunel University, PhD in philosophy, November 2011, “’O Effeminacy! Effeminacy!’ War, Masculinity and the Myth of Liberal Peace,” *European Journal of International Relations* Volume 19 Issue 1, GENDER MODIFIED OR IN CONTEXT) gz

‘O Effeminacy! Effeminacy! Who wou’d imagine this could be the Vice of such as appear no inconsiderable Men?’ (Shaftesbury, 2001 [1732], III: 113). Such was the concern of Shaftesbury in 1732. I have been arguing that this concern permeated the political discourse of 18th-century liberalism. The reason the thinkers in question thought effeminacy a vice is because they believed that, along with associated vices such as luxury, it undermined the martial spirit. As I have shown, the extent of this concern was huge. I suggest that this is also politically telling, in a number of ways.¶ First, because it reveals the belief in the necessity for strong martial spirit and sustained military values among the thinkers in question. Indeed, the liberals in question were not merely sensitive to the tradition of thought which emphasized the creative role of war in the development of civilization and the shaping of the character of human beings, but actually believed in and perpetuated this tradition. Far from perpetual peace, what was at stake in the liberal thinking of the time was a concern with how to maintain commercial order as a realm of liberty such that the virtues of civil society did not threaten the virtues of martial power. Within this, the question of how to stop the effeminacy and luxury of civilization from overawing the masculinity of military virtue and undermining the martial nature of masculine power was paramount. One might note here that this argument reinforces the feminist claim regarding classical liberalism’s patriarchal nature, pointing as it does to the unity of the masculinity required for war and the masculinity required for citizenship (Elshtain, 1987; Lloyd, 1986: 63–76). My point is that this somewhat undermines one of the historical claims made within the liberal peace thesis, namely that the conceptual underpinning of the liberal peace lies in part in the 18th-century Scottish Enlightenment’s conception of commercial ~~man~~ [person] and civil society.¶ My second suggestion is that any reasonable exercise in the history of 18th-century political thought would have shown IR theorists the need to disentangle the association of economic liberalism and peace. The association itself is a product of a link first made by the more doctrinaire ‘free traders’ of the 19th century peddling the myth of a link between peace and trade (Earle, 1990: 222, 226; Howe, 2007; Winch, 1978: 104). From there, the idea of a liberal vision of peace rooted in an image of economic order very easily became a piece of received wisdom. Too many IR theorists have accepted this received wisdom uncritically and perpetuated it unthinkingly, systematically ignoring the importance which the 18th-century liberals attached to military valour and martial virtues and which suggests that the belief that key thinkers of the liberal Enlightenment valued peace above all else is a piece of political mythology of the highest order. Some years ago David Spiro (1994) challenged some of the empirical data of the liberal peace thesis and provocatively called his paper ‘The insignificance of the liberal peace’. The problem, I suggest, is not the insignificance of the thesis but its status as a modern political myth.¶ As such, my third suggestion is that as well as debunking such myths and challenging the received wisdom of IR, a critical engagement in the history of ideas supports recent attempts to radically rethink the liberal tradition. I have elsewhere argued that liberalism’s key concept is less liberty and more security. Nowhere is this clearer than in 18th-century liberal thought, which subsumed liberty under the idea of security (Neocleous, 2000, 2008). But as Michael Shapiro (1993: 15) notes, ‘security’ in the work of Smith (and, we might add, other classical liberals) is never a reference to mere ‘defence’, but also connotes an active and militaristic practice. Liberalism as a political ideology has been committed to this active militaristic practice since its inception, which is one of the reasons why liberal states as organized political powers have turned out to be so fundamentally violent.**¶** The implications of this argument therefore go beyond merely pointing out the poor engagement with the history of political thought on the part of too many IR scholars.¶ Rather, the argument lends support to a growing body of work arguing that liberalism needs to be considered less as a doctrine inherently committed to peace and much more through the ‘ferocious violence with which it deploys techniques to penetrate and organise the dispositions of liberal subjects themselves’ (Reid, 2004: 64). In the history of ideas there has been a revival of interest in what Pocock (1975) calls the Machiavellian moment, a key aspect of which is the cultivation of military virtue as part of one’s civic duty. There is a decidedly liberal version of this through the centuries. ‘There is a kind of violence within liberalism’, notes Richard Tuck, ‘in which liberty and warfare (both civil and international conflict) were bound together’ (1999: 195). A fair amount of recent work from a range of positions and with a variety of foci lends weight to this argument, and really points us towards the idea that liberalism needs to be seen less through the lens of peace and more through the lens of war (Barkawi and Laffey, 2001; Dillon and Reid, 2009; Kochi, 2009; Losurdo, 2011; Meyer, 2008; Neocleous, 2010, 2011; Seymour, 2008; Spieker, 2011; Thorup, 2006). Far from being insignificant, the liberal peace thesis plays a crucial ideological role in masking classical liberalism’s understanding of war as the exercise of the liberal spirit.

**This manifests itself in a drive for certainty which causes endless violence**

**Burke, 7** (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action**.** The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

**The alternative is to deterritorialize the 1AC through a historical and critical lens – rather than objectively approaching their threat discourse, we choose more diverse forms of analysis**

**Krause and Williams 97** (Keith Krause, professor of political science at the Graduate Institute on International and Development Studies, Michael C Williams, professor of international relations at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, “From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies,” chapter 2 of Critical Security Studies, p 49-50)

The challenges to the conventional understanding of security and the object to be secured also necessitate an epistemological shift in the way security is to be understood and studied. What is involved is a shift in focus from abstract individualism and contractual sovereignty to a stress on culture, civilization, and identity; the role of ideas, norms, and values in the constitution of that which is to be secured; and the historical context within which this process takes place. Epistemologically, this involves moving away from the objectivist, rationalist approach of both neorealism and neoliberalism, and toward more interpretive modes of analysis. While these issues have gained some prominence in debates over the nature of regime theory and the study of international organizations, they have made little impact on security studies.51 This is clearly illustrated by Helga Haftendorn’s attempts to broaden the ambit of security studies. On method, she concludes that the goal of security studies is “to construct an empirically testable paradigm,” which involves defining the “set of observational hypotheses,” the “hard core of irrefutable assumptions,” and the “‘set of scope conditions’ that…are required for a ‘progressive’ research program.” Although she admits that “we might do well to follow [Robert] Keohane’s counsel to apply somewhat ‘softer,’ more interpretive standards,” there is little room in this approach for studying norm change and the role of ideational elements in *constituting* the historical context within which actors take specific decisions.52 Despite Haftendorn’s goal of incorporating new issues that are normatively driven, the subordination of normative and reflexive conceptions of agency to objectivist visions of method remains largely undisturbed, and she remains committed to the fact value distinction. To understand security from a broader perspective means to look at the ways in which the objects to be secured, the perceptions of threats to them, and the available means of securing them (both intellectual and material) have shifted over time.53 New threats emerge; new enemies are created; erstwhile fellow citizens become objects of hatred and violence; former enemies can be transformed into members of the same community. The status of Others is uncertain, needing to be deciphered and determined.54 To comprehend these processes requires an understanding of the problematics of security as constituted by self-reflexive historical practices. The knightly code of honor, for example, was both a central structuring practice of latemedieval conflict and a central object that was to be secured. Honor was an integral part of conflict in its genesis as well as its practice. To view the military conflict of the late-medieval world as a competition between instrumentally rational actors in the modern sense is to misunderstand it in both form and content.55 The shift to interpretive models of understanding (broadly conceived) also yields a different vision of the transformation of practices. As historically grounded, the practices of security become capable of conscious transformation through the process of critical reflection. No longer objective in the sense of a fixed reality that the analyst can only mirror, reality as the realm of subjective practices and structures becomes self-reflexive. This is most emphatically not to say that security studies needs to move away from studying the role of ideas, institutions, and instruments of organized violence in political life. In this respect, the continuing defenders of traditional strategic/security studies are correct (although this formulation will probably leave them uncomfortable). But if we are to understand these realities, we must take them more seriously than the abstractions of neorealism allow. We must grasp the genesis and structure of particular security problems as grounded in concrete historical conditions and practices, rather than in abstract assertions of transcendental rational actors and scientific methods. We must understand the genesis of conflicts and the creation of the dilemmas of security as grounded in reflexive practices rather than as the outcome of timeless structures.56

**Every affirmation is fundamentally a decision and an affirmation of a particular interpretation of what it means to decide – their attempt to elevate their particular method of decision to the status of metaphysics links to all of our offense and begs the question of their justification for exclusion**

**Dillon 99** (Michael Dillon, professor of international relations at the University of Lancaster, PhD in philosophy, April 1999, “Another Justice,” published in Political Theory Volume 27 Number 2, page 157-8)

I wish to argue, in addition, that the condition of being-in-between is exemplified by the 'inter' of another international relations. Especially in the proximity of the Refugee, for example, there is an explicit manifestation of the advent of the claim of Justice. The traditional intersubjectivity of international relations defaults, through the way in which the advent of the Refugee always calls to presence the stranger in the self itself, into the intra of a plural and divided self. The figure of the sovereign subject so integral to traditional international thought falsely poses the key questions of the self, of origination and of Justice. There can be no sovereign point of departure. The law is always born from a broken law, justice from the absence of Justice. There is always a co-presence of the other in the same; such that every self is a hybrid. The origin, if it is to issue forth in anything, therefore, must always already come divided and incomplete. The advent of Justice and the possibility of politics arise only because that plethos is ineradicable. There is then no sovereign subject. The self is a divided self from a beginning that is itself incomplete. It is only by virtue of that very division, that very incompleteness, that the question of justice arises at all. Thought of another Justice is therefore a continuous displacement of normal justice, a radical discomfort to it. But I have first to note how normal justice understands its place before considering the taking place of Justice differently. At its simplest the normal model of justice-sometimes known as the distributive model-notes that any society is governed by rules.9 Normal models differ, however, according to how they account for the derivation of those rules, what those rules define as just and unjust, and who or what is empowered by them to make, execute, and interpret the law. The most basic of these rules establish the status and entitlements of those who belong to the community. Correspondingly, these rules also specify who is a stranger, outsider, or alien, and they sometimes make provision for how the alien is to be dealt with should she or he appear at, or cross, the threshold of the community. This, in its crudest terms, is distributive justice. The laws, which it specifies, establish a regime of justice that expresses the ethical beliefs and commitments of that community. More than that, they inaugurate them. Each juridical decision is in some way, great or small, a communal rededication of those beliefs. The law, then, does not merely make a decision or enact a will. It reinaugurates a sense of what it is to have a will and make a decision in that community, as well as to what ends and purposes these may be devoted.10 Such law has to come from somewhere. An official narrative of one form or another supports how the community came to have the law which it does, together with the means and manner by which it is to be interpreted and exercised. That narrative explains both the origins of the law and the way in which it has been handed down. God and covenants, immemorial traditions and social contracts are amongst the most favoured of these. Divine inspiration, the dictates of reason, or a common sense are then said to furnish the law with the secure foundation it is thought to require. Injustice for the normal model, it further follows, is a function of sin, or the breakdown of reason, or the failure to attend to the dictates of common sense. One way or another, each of these ruptures tends to be blamed upon the irruption of irregular passions and desires which the law was inaugurated to limit and control as the means of determining and dispensing justice in the first place. Injustice for the normal model, in short, is the abnormal which effects a breach in the very paternity of the law itself. It is what the normal model claims to keep at bay as distributive justice orders the affairs of the community. All thought of justice and politics must, of course, pass through thought. How could it be otherwise? We think justice in the way that we do because of the various forms through which it is established and distributed. We also think justice in the way that we do because of the way that we think. The thought of another Justice is necessarily dependent therefore upon a way of thinking other than that which has historically come to govern our diverse onto-theological traditions of justice. That other way of thinking has continuously to be contrasted with the thought that underlies distributive justice, so that the characteristic features of another Justice may be differentiated from those of the normal model. Two of the key points of difference concern the interpretation of Time and the interpretation of the Human. Each of these derives from what I call the return of the ontological in continental thought.

**Off**

**A. Interpretation – “economic engagement” means the aff must be an exclusively economic action – it cannot encompass broader forms of engagement**

**Jakstaite, 10** - Doctoral Candidate Vytautas Magnus University Faculty of Political Sciences and Diplomacy (Lithuania) (Gerda, “Containment and Engagement as Middle-Range Theories” Baltic Journal of Law & Politics Volume 3, Number 2 (2010), DOI: 10.2478/V10076-010-0015-7)

The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state‟s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations

**That means trade and aid in the form of loans or grants**

**Resnick, 1** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” Vol. 54 No. 2, Political Science Complete)

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT

In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:

DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS

Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations

Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes

Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa

MILITARY CONTACTS

Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa

Arms transfers

Military aid and cooperation

Military exchange and training programs

Confidence and security-building measures

Intelligence sharing

ECONOMIC CONTACTS

Trade agreements and promotion

Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants

CULTURAL CONTACTS

Cultural treaties

Inauguration of travel and tourism links

Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25)

**B. Violation – the affirmative establishes a binational water bank, which is not an exclusively economic instrument**

**C. Vote negative**

**1. Predictable limits – blurring the lines between economic and other forms of engagement makes any positive interaction with another country topical – becomes impossible for the neg to predict or prepare**

**2. Equitable ground – the economic limit is vital to critiques of economics, trade disads, and non-economic counterplans**

**Water Wars**

**Environmental apocalypticism causes eco-authoritarianism and mass violence against those deemed environmental threats – also causes political apathy which turns case**

**Buell 3** (Frederick Buell, cultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and the author of five books; “From Apocalypse To Way of Life,” pg. 185-186)

Looked at critically, then, **crisis discourse** thus suffers from a number of liabilities. First, it seems to have become a **political liability** almost as much as an asset. It calls up a **fierce and effective opposition** with its predictions; worse, its more specific predictions are all too **vulnerable to refutation by events**. It also **exposes environmentalists to being called grim doomsters** and antilife Puritan extremists. Further, concern with crisis has all too often tempted people to try to find a “**total solution**” to the problems involved— a phrase that, as an astute analyst of the limitations of crisis discourse, John Barry, puts it, is all too reminiscent of the Third Reich’s infamous “**final solution**.”55 A total crisis of society—environmental crisis at its gravest—threatens to translate despair into **inhumanist authoritarianism**; more often, however, it helps keep merely dysfunctional authority in place. It thus leads, Barry suggests, to the belief that only elite- and expert-led solutions are possible.56 At the same timeit **depoliticizes people**, inducing them to accept their impotence as individuals; this is something that has made many people today feel, ironically and/or passively, that since it makes no difference at all what any individual does on his or her own, one might as well go along with it. Yet another pitfall for the full and sustained elaboration of environmental crisis is, though least discussed, perhaps the most deeply ironic. A problem with deep cultural and psychological as well as social effects, it is embodied in a startlingly simple proposition: the worse one feels environmental crisis is, the more one is tempted to turn one’s back on the environment. This means, preeminently, turning one’s back on “nature”—on traditions of nature feeling, traditions of knowledge about nature (ones that range from organic farming techniques to the different departments of ecological science), and traditions of nature-based activism. If nature is thoroughly wrecked these days, **people need to delink from nature** and live in postnature—a conclusion that, as the next chapter shows, many in U.S. society drew at the end of the millenium. Explorations of how deeply “nature” has been wounded and how intensely vulnerable to and dependent on human actions it is can thus lead, ironically, to **further indifference** to nature-based environmental issues, not greater concern with them. But what quickly becomes evident to any reflective consideration of the difficulties of crisis discourse is that all of these liabilities are in fact bound tightly up with one specific notion of environmental crisis—with 1960s- and 1970s-style environmental apocalypticism. Excessive concern about them does not recognize that crisis discourse as a whole has significantly changed since the 1970s. They remain inducements to look away from serious reflection on environmental crisis only if one does not explore how environmental crisis has turned of late from apocalypse to dwelling place. The apocalyptic mode had a number of prominent features: it was preoccupied with running out and running into walls; with scarcity and with the imminent rupture of limits; with actions that promised and temporally predicted imminent total meltdown; and with (often, though not always) the need for immediate “**total solution**.” **Thus doomsterism was its reigning mode; eco-authoritarianism** was a grave temptation; and as crisis was elaborated to show more and more severe deformations of nature, temptation increased to refute it, or give up, or even cut off ties to clearly terminal “nature.”

**Neoliberalism crushes access to water**

**Concannon 1**

http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/briefings/gats\_stealing\_water.pdf

edited by Hannah Griffiths, Friends of the Earth

Friends of the Earth and our federation of grassroots groups in 77 countries defend the environment and champion a more healthy and just world. We're progressive environmental advocates who pull no punches and speak sometimes uncomfortable truths to power. It's an approach that for four decades has yielded victories protecting our planet and its people. Our current campaigns focus on promoting clean energy and solutions to climate change, keeping toxic and risky technologies out of the food we eat and products we use, and protecting marine ecosystems and the people who live and work near them.

There is general consensus that the world is facing a looming water crisis and investment in water resource management and a water strategy are needed. GATS and the WTO are not the appropriate fora to address this, however, and there are many reasons why GATS will not help solve the crisis. Liberalisation of trade in water inevitably means opening up water services to the private sector, yet privatisation of water services to date has been problematic, with negative impacts for consumers and the environment. Despite this, GATS commitments would be irreversible as countries are prevented from altering them once they have been made and there is no fallback position. GATS is likely to undermine environmental protection as it contains only a very narrow environmental exception. Governments could find that laws and measures they have introduced for environmental protection and water conservation could be classified as barriers to trade and be overruled by the WTO. GATS is not compatible with the basic human right of access to clean, safe drinking water. 'Full cost-recovery' - the principle promoted by the IMF and World Bank that people should pay the full cost of water, or go without - would effectively be enshrined in law by GATS. Sustainable water distribution practices could also be undermined as charges could be introduced, for example for the collection of rainwater. It is often ordinary people who end up paying the increased financial cost resulting from water privatisation as companies try to recoup their investment. This is either through increased prices for water or through state subsidies of the companies. A comprehensive review of the impact of liberalising trade in services is needed before further discussions and liberalisation take place either inside or outside of GATS. GATS is the wrong treaty, in the wrong place at the wrong time.

**Liberalization worsens the global water crisis**

**I**nternational **F**orum on **G**lobalization **03**

http://www.ifg.org/analysis/wto/cancun/gatswater.htm

THE INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON GLOBALIZATION (IFG) is a North-South research and educational institution composed of leading activists, economists, scholars, and researchers providing analysis and critiques on the cultural, social, political, and environmental impacts of economic globalization. Formed in 1994, the IFG came together out of shared concern that the world's corporate and political leadership was rapidly restructuring global politics and economics on a level that was as historically significant as any period since the Industrial Revolution.

As trade ministers from the WTO‚s 146 member countries meet in Cancun, we call on them to halt discussions on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and to resist any contrary attempts which seek speed up these negotiations. The United States and the European Union, whose corporations have most to gain from these talks, are pushing for a political declaration in Cancun calling on all WTO members to submit their services, including essential services, to the GATS. For these corporations, GATS promises access to new markets and enhanced rights. In Cancun, promises made by developed countries in other WTO areas will be used to extract progress on GATS, even though GATS is not a key agenda item. This puts immense pressure on developing countries to commit more of their services, including basic services such as water, to the WTO‚s binding trade rules. The GATS proponents repeatedly frame their ambitions in the context of development. They refer to the ŒDoha Development Agenda‚. In water specifically, the EU publicly claims that current negotiations, Œcould potentially contribute to international efforts to improve access to water.‚ Yet in confidential internal memos between the European Commission and the top three European water companies (Suez, Vivendi and RWE), the EC states that, Œone of the main objectives in the current round of negotiations is to achieve real and meaningful access for European service providers for their exports of environmental services [which includes water services].‚ In July 2002, as part of ongoing GATS negotiations, the EU submitted demands to 109 countries, requesting ambitious levels of market access for its corporations. This included requests to 72 developing countries, several of them least developed countries, requesting access to their water services. The US also submitted extensive and controversial demands, which under the guise of Œtransparency‚ render domestic decision-making vulnerable to foreign commercial interests. Developing countries have every reason to resist such far-reaching demands. So far, the liberalisation of water services has caused grave problems in countries where the involvement of foreign multinationals has typically made water more expensive than poor households can afford. Any country making GATS commitments in water would bind is such liberalisation for the future, making it effectively impossible for it to withdraw, even if service provision is unaffordable to the poor, the water service is of poor quality, or a future government wishes to change the policy. The United Nations Sub-Commission on Human Rights, concerned with the effect of GATS on universal service obligations, suggests that GATS conflicts with the human rights obligations, of WTO member countries. Barely a year ago at the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, heads of the governments made commitments to halve the proportion of people without access to water and that of those without access to sanitation by 2015. But the evidence from many communities, especially those in the developing world, is that the global water crisis will worsen if water is subjected to WTO rules that put corporate interests ahead of the right to water as fundamental to life.

**Hits the worst off first**

**Concannon 01**

http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/briefings/gats\_stealing\_water.pdf

edited by Hannah Griffiths, Friends of the Earth

Friends of the Earth and our federation of grassroots groups in 77 countries defend the environment and champion a more healthy and just world. We're progressive environmental advocates who pull no punches and speak sometimes uncomfortable truths to power. It's an approach that for four decades has yielded victories protecting our planet and its people. Our current campaigns focus on promoting clean energy and solutions to climate change, keeping toxic and risky technologies out of the food we eat and products we use, and protecting marine ecosystems and the people who live and work near them.

Fresh water is not a naturally abundant economic good that can be freely traded, but a finite resource that is integral to the survival of all life. Access to a fair share of clean, healthy water is a basic human right. No wholesale, global liberalisation of a single resource has been tried before, let alone of a resource as vital as the world’s fresh water. Decisions about how water is distributed and used should be based on human rights and environmental needs rather than on pure economics. It is more important that existing water supplies are conserved, made more efficient and fairly distributed, than that they are made subject to global supply and demand. The Ghanaian organisation Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC) estimates that 50-70 % of the urban population in Ghana live in poor shanties dotted around the cities.12 Most of these people earn less than one dollar per day, not enough to buy the water they need. ISODEC say that "the current water tariff rates that the government of Ghana and the World Bank think are 'below the market rate' are already beyond the means of most of the population in Ghana" ‘Full cost-recovery’ - the principle promoted by the IMF/ World Bank-supported private sector participation programmes, that people should pay the full cost of water, or go without- is placing precious water supplies out of reach to the urban poor in Ghana and elsewhere. GATS would effectively enshrine this principle in law when countries open up their water services to the private sector. World Bank/ IMF documents stress laudable goals for increasing water access to the world’s poor, promoting sound environmental management and allocating the resource in a socially equitable, fair way. Yet the credibility gap between the pro-poor rhetoric of the Bank, the IMF, rich countries and the WTO, and the practical impacts of their policies is gaping. By subjecting water access to market trends and WTO decision-making processes, an agreement like GATS is likely to exacerbate the world’s water problems. Minority interests – especially those of global corporations and foreign investors – would take precedence, with potentially devastating implications for fragile ecosystems and poor communities.

**That turns scarcity**

**I**nternational **F**orum on **G**lobalization **03**

<http://www.ifg.org/pdf/cancun/issues-WTOwater.pdf>

THE INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON GLOBALIZATION (IFG) is a North-South research and educational institution composed of leading activists, economists, scholars, and researchers providing analysis and critiques on the cultural, social, political, and environmental impacts of economic globalization. Formed in 1994, the IFG came together out of shared concern that the world's corporate and political leadership was rapidly restructuring global politics and economics on a level that was as historically significant as any period since the Industrial Revolution.

An adequate supply of clean water is a basic human right. Every person in the world has a right to clean water and healthy sanitation systems no matter where they live. This right is best ensured by keeping water and sewage services in the public sector, regulating the protection of water supplies and promoting the efficient use of water. Adequate supplies of clean water for people in water-scarce regions can only be ensured by promoting conservation and protection of local water resources. This does not mean that water should be “free” or that everyone can help themselves. However, a policy of water pricing that respects this principle would help conserve water and preserve the rights of all to have access to it. Water pricing and “green taxes” (which raise government revenues while discouraging pollution and resource consumption) should place a heavier burden on agribusiness and industry than on citizens; funds collected from these sources should be used to provide basic water for all. Economic globalization policies are not water sustainable. Economic globalization’s values of unlimited growth and increased global trade are totally incompatible with the search for solutions to water scarcity. Designed to reward the strongest and most ruthless, economic globalization locks out the forces of local democracy so desperately needed for a water-secure future. Economic globalization undermines local communities by allowing for easy mobility of capital and the theft of local resources. Liberalized trade and investment enables some countries to live beyond their ecological and water resource means; others abuse their limited water sources to grow crops for export. In wealthy countries, cities and industries are mushrooming on deserts. A watersustainable society would denounce these practices.

**No water wars**

**Kramer et al 13**

Annika Kramer, Adelphi Senior Project Manager, Aaron Wolf, Oregon State University Professor of Geography, College of Earth, Ocean and Atmospheric Sciences, and Director, Program in Water Conflict Management, Alexander Carius, Adelphi Director, and Geoff Dabelko, Jan/March 2013, The key to managing conflict and cooperation over water, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002191/219156E.pdf

**No evidence of coming ‘water wars’**

International basins that include political boundaries of two or more countries cover around 45% of the Earth’s land surface, host about 40% of the world’s population and account for approximately 60% of global river flow. Moreover, the number is growing: in 1978, the United Nations listed 214 international basins; today there are 276, largely due to the internationalization of basins through political changes like the break-up of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, as well as access to better mapping technology.

The high number of shared rivers, combined with increasing water scarcity for growing populations, led many politicians and headlines to trumpet coming ‘water wars.’ In 1995, for example, former World Bank Vice-President Ismail Serageldin claimed that ‘the wars of the next century will be about water.’ Invariably, these warnings point to the arid and hostile Middle East, where armies have mobilized and fired shots over this scarce and precious resource. Elaborate, if misnamed, ‘hydraulic imperative’ theories cite water as the prime motivation for military strategies and territorial conquests, particularly in the ongoing conflict between Arabs and Israelis.

The only problem with this scenario is a lack of evidence. In 1951–1953 and again in 1964–1966, Israel and Syria exchanged fire over the latter’s project to divert the Jordan River but the final exchange, featuring assaults by both tanks and aircraft, stopped construction and effectively ended water-related tensions between the two states. Nevertheless, the 1967 war broke out less than a year later. Water had little, if any, impact on the military’s strategic thinking in subsequent Israelo-Arab violence, including the 1967, 1973 and 1982 wars, yet water was an underlying source of political stress and one of the most difficult topics in subsequent negotiations. In other words, even though the wars were not fought over water, allocation agreements were an impediment to peace.

While water supplies and infrastructure have often served as military tools or targets, **no states have gone to war specifically over water resources** since the city-states of Lagash and Umma fought each other in the Tigris− Euphrates Basin in 2500 BCE. Instead, according to FAO, more than 3600 water treaties were signed from 805 to 1984 CE. Whereas most were related to navigation, over time, a growing number addressed water management, including flood control, hydropower projects or allocations in international basins. Since 1820, more than 680 water treaties and other water- related agreements have been signed, with more than half of these concluded in the past 50 years.

Researchers at Oregon State University have compiled a dataset of every reported interaction, be it conflictive or cooperative, between two or more nations where water was the driver of the interaction. Their analysis highlighted four key findings.

First, despite the potential for dispute in international basins, the incidence of acute conflict over international water resources is overwhelmed by the rate of cooperation. The last 60 years (1948−2008) have seen only 44 acute disputes (those involving violence), 30 of which occurred between Israel and one of its neighbours. The total number of water-related events between nations of any magnitude is also weighted towards cooperation: 759 conflict-related events versus 1 705 cooperative ones, implying that **violence over water is neither strategically rational, nor hydrographically effective, nor economically viable.**

Second, **despite the fiery rhetoric of politicians** − aimed more often at their own constituencies than at the enemy − most **actions taken over water are mild**. Of all the events, some 40% fall between mild verbal support and mild verbal hostility. If the next level on either side − official verbal support and official verbal hostility − is added into the equation, the share of verbal events reaches about 60% of the total. Thus, almost two-thirds of all events are verbal only and more than two-thirds of these led to no official sanction.

Third, there are more issues of cooperation than of conflict. The distribution of cooperative events covers a broad spectrum, including water quantity, quality, economic development, hydropower and joint management. In contrast, almost 90% of the conflict-laden events relate to quantity and infrastructure. Furthermore, almost all extensive military acts fall within these two categories.

Fourth, despite the lack of violence, water acts as both an irritant and a unifier. As an irritant, water can make good relations bad and bad relations worse. Despite the complexity, however, international waters can act as a unifier in basins with relatively strong institutions.

**The historical record proves that** international **water disputes do get resolved, even among enemies and even as conflicts erupt over other issues**. Some of the world’s most vociferous enemies have negotiated water agreements or are in the process of doing so and the institutions they have created often prove to be resilient, even when relations are strained.

**Nations will just import resources**

**Fleck 9** (John Fleck, journalist and freelance writer; “TRANSBOUNDARY ISSUES: WHERE ARE ALL THE WATER WARS?”, 3/25/2009, http://www.inkstain.net/fleck/2009/03/transboundary-issues-where-are-all-the-water-wars/)

Barnaby had set out to write a book about water wars. But the more research she did, the more she realized they didn’t happen. Why is that? Her answer seems straightforward and persuasive: Water shortages show up in their most extreme form as a shortage of water needed to grow food. Nations that cannot grow all their own food import it from elsewhere. Conflict over a lack of water, she found, is routinely addressed by nations through food imports rather than going to war: The relationship of food trade to water sustainability is often not obvious, and often remains invisible: no political leader will gain any popularity by acknowledging that their country makes up the water budget only by importing food. This is not some arm-waving theoretical argument, but rather an empirical assertion. To the extent there are wars that might look like wars over water, Barnaby argues, they in fact are wars over more complex power relations between nations, with water a bit player rather than a central cause.

**The spectral threat of nuclear war is itself part of a system of deterrence which neutralizes all events, including the real possibility of nuclear war. this is an implosive violence; the balance of terror is the terror of balance. that all things must be quilted through the nuclear issue marks its function as a simulacrum to conceal the death of politics**

**Baudrillard 81** (Jean Baudrillard, ask Jack, “Simulacra and Simulation,” pp 32-4)

The apotheosis of simulation: the nuclear. However, the balance of terror is never ¶ anything but the spectacular slope of a system of deterrence that has insinuated itself ¶ from the inside into all the cracks of daily life. Nuclear suspension only serves to seal the ¶ trivialized system of deterrence that is at the heart of the media, of the violence without ¶ consequences that reigns throughout the world, of the aleatory apparatus of all the ¶ choices that are made for us. The most insignificant of our behaviors is regulated by ¶ neutralized, indifferent, equivalent signs, by zero-sum signs like those that regulate the ¶ "strategy of games" (but the true equation is elsewhere, and the unknown is precisely that ¶ variable of simulation which makes of the atomic arsenal itself a hyperreal form, a ¶ simulacrum that dominates everything and reduces all "ground-level" events to being ¶ nothing but ephemeral scenarios, transforming the life left us into survival, into a stake ¶ without stakes - not even into a life insurance policy: into a policy that already has no ¶ value). ¶ It is not the direct threat of atomic destruction that paralyzes our lives, it is deterrence ¶ that gives them leukemia. And this deterrence comes from that fact that even the real ¶ atomic clash is precluded - precluded like the eventuality of the real in a system of signs. ¶ The whole world pretends to believe in the reality of this threat (this is understandable on ¶ the part of the military, the gravity of their exercise and the discourse of their "strategy" ¶ are at stake), but it is precisely at this level that there are no strategic stakes. The whole ¶ originality of the situation lies in the improbability of destruction.¶ Deterrence precludes war - the archaic violence of expanding systems. Deterrence itself ¶ is the neutral, implosive violence of metastable systems or systems in involution. There is ¶ no longer a subject of deterrence, nor an adversary nor a strategy - it is a planetary ¶ structure of the annihilation of stakes. Atomic war, like the Trojan War, will not take ¶ place. The risk of nuclear annihilation only serves as a pretext, through the sophistication ¶ of weapons (a sophistication that surpasses any possible objective to such an extent that it ¶ is itself a symptom of nullity), for installing a universal security system, a universal ¶ lockup and control system whose deterrent effect is not at all aimed at an atomic clash ¶ (which was never in question, except without a doubt in the very initial stages of the cold ¶ war, when one still confused the nuclear apparatus with conventional war) but, rather, at ¶ the much greater probability of any real event, of anything that would be an event in the ¶ general system and upset its balance. The balance of terror is the terror of balance.¶ Deterrence is not a strategy, it circulates and is exchanged between nuclear protagonists ¶ exactly as is international capital in the orbital zone of monetary speculation whose ¶ fluctuations suffice to control all global exchanges. Thus the money of destruction ¶ (without any reference to real destruction, any more than floating capital has a real ¶ referent of production) that circulates in nuclear orbit suffices to control all the violence ¶ and potential conflicts around the world.¶ What is hatched in the shadow of this mechanism with the pretext of a maximal, ¶ "objective," threat, and thanks to Damocles' nuclear sword, is the perfection of the best ¶ system of control that has ever existed. And the progressive satellization of the whole ¶ planet through this hypermodel of security.¶ The same goes for peaceful nuclear power stations. Pacification does not distinguish ¶ between the civil and the military: everywhere where irreversible apparatuses of control ¶ are elaborated, everywhere where the notion of security becomes omnipotent, ¶ everywhere where the norm replaces the old arsenal of laws and violence (including ¶ war), it is the system of deterrence that grows, and around it grows the historical, social, ¶ and political desert. A gigantic involution that makes every conflict, every finality, every ¶ confrontation contract in proportion to this blackmail that interrupts, neutralizes, freezes ¶ them all. No longer can any revolt, any story be deployed according to its own logic ¶ because it risks annihilation. No strategy is possible any longer, and escalation is only a ¶ puerile game given over to the military. The political stake is dead, only simulacra of ¶ conflicts and carefully circumscribed stakes remain.

**Eempirical evidence disproves their speculation**

**Weinthal and Rengosh 11**

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Weinthal's experience lies in environmental policy, international environmental institutions, the political-economy of the resource curse, water cooperation and conflict, and environmental security.

By the end of the twentieth century, it was thus widely assumed that water scarcity would be a driver of conflict between nation states, especially in the arid regions of MEN A. World leaders such as former UN secretary-general, Boutros Boucros-Ghali, famously warned, 'the next war in the Middle East will be fought over water, not polities' (Vesilind 1993: 53). The Economist, furthermore, predicted in 1999 that \*[w]ith 3,5 billion people affected by water shortages by 2050, conditions are ripe for a century of water conflicts'. **The empirical evidence, however, has yet to support such prophecies.** Rather, when it comes to water resources at the interstate level, cooperation is much more ubiquitous. The historical record shows that states rarely if ever go to war over water; in parsing **more than 1,800** state-to-state water interactions in trans-boundary basins between 1946 and 1999, Wolf et al. (200.3) **demonstrated that none have led to formal war.**

**Biofuels**

**The status quo food crisis in directly linked to the logic of neoliberal–speculation and land grabbing proves**

**Houtart 11** (Francois, Belgian Marxist Sociologist, serves as an advisor to CETRI (Centre Tricontinental) a Belgian non-governmental organization which he founded in 1976, was awarded the UNESCO-Madanjeet Singh Prize for the Promotion of Tolerance and Non-Violence, “ FROM ‘COMMON GOODS’ TO THE ‘COMMON GOOD OF HUMANITY,” ROSA LUXEMBURG FOUNDATION BRUSSELS, NOVEMBER)

There are two aspects to the food crisis. One is a conjunction of short-term factors, the other is due to (structural) long term factors. The former can be seen in the sudden rise of food prices in 2007 and 2008. It is true that this can be attributed to several causes, such as dwindling reserves, but **the main reason was speculative**, with the production of agrofuels being partly responsible (maize-based ethanol in the United States). Thus over a period of two years, the price of wheat on the Chicago stock exchange rose by 100 per cent, maize by 98 per cent and ethanol by 80 per cent. During these years appreciable amounts of speculative capital moved from other sectors into investing in food production in the expectation of rapid and significant profits. As a consequence, according to the FAO director general, in each of the years 2008 and 2009 more than 50 million people fell below the poverty line, and the total number of those living in poverty rose to the unprecedented level of over one billion people. **This was clearly the result of the logic of profits**, the capitalist law of value. The second aspect is structural. Over the last few years there has been an expansion of monoculture, resulting in the concentration of land-holdings – in other words, a veritable reversal of land reform. Peasant and family agriculture is being destroyed all over the world on the pretext of its low productivity. It is true that monoculture can produce from 500 and even 1,000 times more than peasant agriculture in its present state. Nevertheless, two factors should be taken into account: first, this kind of production is leading to ecological destruction. It eliminates forests, and contaminates the soil and the waters of oceans and rivers through the massive use of chemical products. Over the next 50 to 75 years we shall be creating the deserts of tomorrow. Second, peasants are being thrown off their lands, and millions of them have to migrate to the cities, to live in shanty towns, exacerbating the tasks of women and causing urban crises, as well as increasing internal migratory pressure, as in Brazil; or they are going to other countries (Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Ecuador, Philippines, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Morocco, Algeria, West Africa).Together with public services, agriculture is now one of the new frontiers for capital (Samir Amin, 2004), especially in times when the profitability of productive industrial capital is relatively reduced and there is a considerable expansion of financial capital seeking new sources of profit. Recently we have witnessed an unprecedented phenomenon: the land grabbing by private and State capital, particularly in Africa, for the production of food and agrofuels. The South Korean corporation Daewoo obtained a concession of 1,200,000 hectares in Madagascar for a period of 99 years, which provoked a serious political crisis in that country and finally a revision of the contract. Countries like Libya and the Gulf Emirates are doing likewise in Mali and various other African countries. European and North American mining and agro-energy multinationals are securing the opportunity to exploit tens of millions of hectares for long periods, as Chinese State and private enterprises are also doing. There is very little concern in these initiatives for the ecological and social implications, which are considered as ‘externalities’, i.e. external to market calculations. And this is precisely the second aspect of capitalist logic, after the growth of the rate of profitability. It is not capital that is having to deal with the negative effects, but local societies and individuals. **This has always been the strategy of capital,** even in the countries of the centre, with no concern for the fate of the working classes, or for the peoples in the peripheries under colonialism. There is no concern, either, for nature and the way of life of local populations. **It is for all these reasons that the food crisis,** in both its conjunctural and structural aspects, **is directly linked to the logic of capitalism.**

**Empirics prove there’s no link between food shortages and war – correlation not causation**

**Scheschkewitz 11** (Daniel, correspondent for Deutsche Welle in Washington, D.C., “Food wars: hunger as a threat to global security,” 11/14, <http://www.dw.de/food-wars-hunger-as-a-threat-to-global-security/a-15444860>, LVS)

It can be very difficult to scientifically prove a direct correlation between conflict and a lack of resources. Theoretically, any additional competition for resources in politically fragile countries and regions can lead to violent conflict. But in most cases, hunger or food shortages are only one of many factors, said Steffen Angenendt, co-author of a study by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs on the conflict potential of natural resource shortages. Unequal distribution or bad government leadership has to pile up in order to create security problems.¶ The most recent hunger crisis in the Horn of Africa threatens security there¶ At that point, protests against high food prices can lead to antagonism toward the regime in power. That is how the street demonstrations against the regime of Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali began, as protests against high bread prices, before they turned against the system as a whole.¶ "The bread riots in the Arab Spring were more symbolic," said Joachim von Braun, the development researcher. "They were the catalyst for demonstrations in a complex political conflict, and thus only one of many reasons for unhappiness."¶ Acute food price demonstrations take place in countries with noticeably lower incomes than Tunisia. There they play an increasingly important role, as in Ethiopia, where the constitution states that the land belongs to the state.

## 2NC

**Framework**

Situatedness determines political efficacy

Dillon 99 (Michael Dillon, professor of politics at the University of Lancaster, 1999, “Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics,” pp 97-8)

Heirs to all this, we find ourselves in the turbulent and now globalized wake of its confluence. As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political4-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about anything that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other regional modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.

**Framing determines the outcomes of policy – uniquely true in the context of security**

**Calkivik 10** (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” <http://purl.umn.edu/99479>) gz

In contrast to traditional approaches to security, which assume an objective¶ world that operates according to ahistorical formal models and rely on a statist¶ political ontology that naturalizes the meaning of what security is and how it can be¶ achieved,120 critical approaches attend to the relations of power that structure the¶ production of in/securities and expose the processes by which national identities and¶ what are deemed as a danger to those identities are constructed. A common point¶ shared by these engagements is their emphasis on the ethical dimension of scholarly¶ inquiry as well as the recognition that knowledge claims are always embedded in¶ relations of power. Their emphasis on the “ought” rather than the “is” reflects less a¶ reworking of the hierarchy between material and ideational power than an emphasis¶ on the social nature of global politics and an understanding that all phenomenon¶ pertaining to international relations exists through the cultural and ideological¶ structures through which they are given meaning and legitimated.121¶ Definition and construction of threats and the way in which states respond to¶ those threats constitutes one of the primary items on the agenda of critical scholars.122¶ While conventional analyses of security conceive threats as arising from material¶ capabilities of sovereign states located in a self-help system, critical approaches point¶ to the ways in which threats and intentions are not objectively given but socially¶ constructed: they involve history, culture, and power relations that cannot be reduced¶ to an objective measure of military capabilities. They investigate the ways in which¶ systems of signification and normative structures constrain or regulate collective¶ security practices or transform conduct in war. All of these studies reveal the¶ historically situated dynamics underlying practices that shape the desire to secure¶ bodies, nations, and states.¶ Primary examples of these engagements come from scholars working under¶ the broad banner of Constructivism.123 These scholars take as their premise the¶ proposition that interests and actions of states are socially constructed and therefore¶ subject to change. While leaving intact the traditional assumptions about military and¶ state-centric understandings of security, some of these studies nevertheless challenge¶ the traditional frameworks by explaining security practices through a recourse to¶ ideational elements such as norms and identities rather than relying on material¶ factors.124 In particular, these works challenge Neorealist and Neoliberal approaches,¶ which assume that states are rational, self-help actors in an anarchic environment. For¶ instance, Alexander Wendt in his seminal study shows how different (Hobbesian or¶ Kantian) anarchical cultures can play a role in channeling the security practices of¶ states on different paths.125 Focusing on international norms, such as the prohibitions¶ against the use of chemical and nuclear weapons or norms of humanitarian¶ intervention, other scholars argue that questions about international security cannot be¶ answered by Realist materialist explanations alone.126 An example to these¶ investigations is provided by Risse-Kappen, who argues that NATO’s post-Cold War¶ survival can only be explained with reference to ideational factors such as values and¶ identity—in this case, democratic, liberal values—that guarantee the institution’s¶ survival in the absence of a distinct threat.127¶ The post-Cold War security environment and proliferating threat discourses in¶ the absence of the “Soviet enemy” provide ample resource for scholars who focus on¶ the representational practices that played role in the construction of threats to state¶ security. For instance, Mutimer examines in detail the linguistic and metaphorical¶ construction of threats to the United States and its allies through the “image of¶ proliferation.”128 He points out the way in which a particular discursive framing of a¶ problem—in this case, the construction of the use of chemical or biological weapons¶ as a problem of proliferation as opposed to a problem of disarmament—shapes the¶ constitution of identities and interests of the actors in question and gives way to¶ particular patterns of foreign policy.¶ The discourse of threats and their social production—as well as the¶ construction of the objects of security as an inextricable aspect of security¶ discourses—constitutes an important item on the agenda of critical investigations.129¶ In conventional analyses, the purported state of nature populated by instrumentally¶ rational actors is taken as the departure point of analysis. Within this framework, the¶ state acts as the primary source of authority, the guarantor of order, and the primary¶ protector of the values and interests of these individuals. While the state is rendered¶ the locus of security, security of the state gets equated to the security of the citizen. In¶ contrast to the positing of the state as the locus of security with a neutrally given¶ interest of survival, critical scholars argue that a concept like national security needs to¶ be understood as a social construction rather than an objectively given fact. For¶ instance, in her case study of the Cuban missile crisis, Jutta Weldes shows how a core¶ concept such as the national interest is discursively constituted through¶ representational practices and linguistic elements.130 Other investigations explore the¶ working of security as a political practice, or the processes of construction of threats¶ through institutional mobilization and knowledge production. Some of these scholars¶ use “speech-act theory” to study how utterances of security constitute certain issues as¶ security problems.131¶ A related line of analysis, conducted mostly from post-structural and postcolonial¶ perspectives, is to trace the operation of power in its various guises and to¶ map the hierarchical relations, highlighting the gaps and silences of hegemonic¶ security narratives. In his Writing Security, David Campbell investigates how certain¶ risks are interpreted as dangers, what power effects these interpretative articulations¶ produce, and how they police the boundaries of the political community and produce¶ obedient subjects.132 Going against the grain of state-centric, strategic accounts of war,¶ scholars such as Michael Shapiro bring to focus the role of political violence in the¶ construction of the geopolitical imaginary and the production/ affirmation of collective¶ identity.133 Others focus on the international interventions that took place during the¶ 1990s and discuss the ways in which these imperial investments are legitimated by the¶ West through a moral discourse based on universal values.134¶ Other studies lay bare the historical biases, Eurocentric assumptions, and¶ racialized or gendered content of conceptions, analyses, theories, and practices of¶ security. Attending to the power of representation, they expose the links between¶ economies of power and “truth” in the re/production of international hierarchies and¶ in/securities. Problematizing the representation of post-colonial states as “failed” or¶ lacking, and hence as a major threat to international security, some of these scholars¶ demonstrate how these so-called failures were precisely the products of unequal¶ encounters with Western colonialism, pointing out the ways in which these¶ hierarchical relations were being reproduced through ongoing unequal economic,¶ social, and military relations.135 They analyze the construction of the non-Western¶ subject as the inferior other—“the Southern” or “the Oriental”—and attend to the¶ ways in which these representations are mobilized to legitimate certain security¶ practices and policies such as nuclear proliferation in the Third World.136 Introducing¶ feminist perspectives into their analyses, other scholars expose the gender biases¶ imbued in security practices, problematizing state security for rendering violence and¶ insecurity from the perspective of women.137

Giving the tool of imagination over to the state exonerates us from responsibility – we should imagine our own role in violence

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs 9-11)

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war,' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere . It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia \_ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

**And, it cause passivity**

**Antonio 95** (Robert J Antonio, PhD in sociology, professor of sociology at the University of Kansas, July 1995, “Nietzsche’s Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History,” *American Journal of Sociology* Volume 101 Number 1, GENDER MODIFIED)

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass disci- pline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83).¶ The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas- tating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor?¶ A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others."¶ Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great ~~man~~ [person] of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

### **AT: Util**

**Utilitarian problem solving justifies mass atrocity and turns its own end**

**Weizman 11** (Eyal Weizman, professor of visual and spatial cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, 2011, “The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza,” pp 8-10)

The theological origins of the lesser evil argument cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book *The Lesser Evil*, Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, ‘do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort.’12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14 Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture,15 to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost.’16 In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Such observations amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s philosophical essay *The Order of Evils*. In this book Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility.17

### **AT: Perm**

**5. Footnoting DA**

**Der Derian 95** (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374)

But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? A stop-gap solution is to supplement the definitional gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist, mindful of a creeping pluralism, will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism - duly backed up with a footnote to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - and then get down to business as usual, that is, using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette effect' in International Relations.

### Link

**The affirmative’s reduction of gradual processes to singular events creates a series of semiotic asymptotes resulting in political inversion**

**Edkins 99** (Jenny Edkins, professor of international politics at the University of Aberystwyth, “Poststructuralism & International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In,” pages 99-100)

Another important outcome of this (and why it is different), however, is the way the act of naming leads to the production of a surplus. The point de capiton or nodal point is the word that “as a word, on the level of the signifier itself, unites a field, constitutes its identity: it is, so to speak, the word to which 'things' themselves refer to recognise themselves in their unity. ” 62 This “inversion” produces a surplus, the object-cause of desire, that unattainable something. An example might make clear the logic of this inversion that produces a surplus. At first the word “famine” appears as a signifier connoting a cluster of supposedly effective properties—“general and widespread shortages of food, leading to widespread death by starvation”—but this is not yet finished. What happens then is that the relation is inverted. We say that it is like this because it is a famine. This inversion, “it is like this because it is a famine, ” then leads to “well, it is not really quite like this yet”—we have not yet seen widespread deaths, for example. In other words, reality does not measure up to the image. What we have is that “unattainable something” that is in famine more than famine. The process of naming has produced places within the symbolic order that things occupy. But the real does not neatly fit the symbolic space; slotting things into the symbolic order is necessary but always, according to Lacan, produces this effect of a nonsymbolizable surplus. To repeat this another way, we could say that the radical contingency of naming implies a gap between the real and modes of its symbolization: A certain historical event can be symbolized in a number of ways—the real itself does not provide the symbolization. The surplus, or impossible real kernel, that which is in an object more than the object, is produced by the signifying operation. It is this that stays the same under all counterfactual circumstances—however much the properties linked with the object may change—because it is not real anyway. All naming is the result of a struggle for ideological hegemony: “The essentialist illusion consists in the belief that it is possible to determine a definite cluster of features, of positive properties, however minimal, which defines the permanent essence” of something; by contrast, according to Žižek, the only way to define something is that it is always designated by the same signifier: “It is the signifier which constitutes the kernel of the object's 'identity.'”

[“peace]

**Cuomo 96** – PhD, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati (Chris, Hypatia Fall 1996. Vol. 11, Issue 3, pg 30)

In "Gender and `Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an eventbased conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.(1) Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. ¶ For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination ¶ and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace

, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests;¶ the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns. I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, technocratic states.(2) Feminists should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the importance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts. But the dramatic nature of declared, large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of military institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality. Philosophical discussions that focus only on the ethics of declaring and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declared military conflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors. These approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral judgement in the face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism.¶

Securitizing water wars obscures the root cause and makes violence inevitable

**Ahmed 12** (Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development, an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, and teacher at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex; "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society," Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis)

Under traditional neorealist logic, a strategic response to global environmental crises must involve the expansion of state-military capabilities in order to strengthen the centralised governance structures whose task is to regulate the international distribution of natural resources, as well as to ensure that a particular state’s own resource requirements are protected. Neorealism under- stands interstate competition, rivalry and warfare as inevitable functions of states’ uncertainty about their own survival, arising from the anarchic structure of the international system. Gains for one state are losses for another, and each state’s attempt to maximise its power relative to all other states is simply a reflection of its rational pursuit of its own security. The upshot is the normalisation of political violence in the international system, including practices such as over-exploitation of energy and the environment, as a ‘rational’ strategy – even though this ultimately amplifies global systemic insecurity. Inability to cooperate internationally and for mutual benefit is viewed as an inevitable outcome of the simple, axiomatic existence of multiple states. The problem is that neorealism cannot explain in the first place the complex interdependence and escalation of global crises. Unable to situate these crises in the context of an international system that is not simply a set of states, but a transnational global structure based on a specific exploitative relationship with the biophysical environment, neorealism can only theorise global crises as ‘new issue areas’ appended to already existing security agendas.59 Yet by the very act of projecting global crises as security threats, neorealism renders itself powerless to prevent or mitigate them by theorising their root structural causes. In effect, despite its emphasis on the reasons why states seek security, neorealism’s approach to issues like climate change actually guarantees greater insecurity by promoting policies which frame these ‘non-traditional’ issues purely as amplifiers of quite traditional threats. As Susanne Peters argues, the neorealist approach renders the militarisation of foreign and domestic policy a pragmatic and necessary response to issues such as resource scarcities – yet, in doing so, it entails the inevitable escalation of ‘resource wars’ in the name of energy security. Practically, this serves not to increase security for competing state and non-state actors, but to debilitate international security through the proliferation of violent conflict to access and control diminishing resources in the context of unpredictable complex emergencies.60 Neorealism thus negates its own theoretical utility and normative value. For if ‘security’ is the fundamental driver of state foreign policies, then why are states chronically incapable of effectively ameliorating the global systemic amplifiers of ‘insecurity’, despite the obvious rationale to do so in the name of warding off collective destruction, if not **planetary annihilation**?61

## 1NR

### water

**Portrayal of Mexico is rooted in Manifest Destiny and the divide between civilized and the barbarian**

**Slater 97** (David, Ph.D from London School of Economics and Professor Emeritus of Geography at Loughborough University, “Geopolitical imaginations across the North-South divide: issues of difference, development and power,” Political Geography Vol. 16 Issue 8, November 1997, pp. 631-653, Muse, slim\_)

The US-Mexican War of 1846-1848 provides a particularly pertinent example of a geopolitical expansion that was informed by an underlying belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority. An armed clash between Mexican and US troops near the Rio Grande, with the loss of American lives, led the then President of the United States to declare War- President Polk declared that Mexico had passed the boundary of the United States, invaded our territory and shed American blood upon American soil. At this time, the Rio Grande had never been recognized as United States territory, but the 1846-1848 War enabled the US to expand into Mexican territory, and through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo the United States acquired the present-day states of California, New Mexico, Nevada and parts of Colorado, Arizona and Utah, a total of over 850 000 square kilometres of Mexican land.15 In 1847, the New York! Herald suggested that ‘the universal Yankee nation can regenerate the people of Mexico in a few years’, but more common were views which posited an unbridgeable gulf between the civilized and the barbarian. The Cincinnati Casket, for instance, urged that a war between enlightened nations would shock humanity, ‘but an occasional conflict with barbarians must be expected’ ‘the Mexicans will be led by this war to think of their weakness and inferiority’.‘” The dominant mood of the time was aptly captured in the American Whig Review, which noted that ‘Mexico was poor, distracted, in anarchy and almost in ruins-what could she do to stay the hand of our power, to impede the march of our greatness? We are Anglo- Saxon Americans; it was our ‘destiny’ to possess and to rule this continent . we were a chosen people, and this was our allotted inheritance, and we must drive out all other nations before us’.i’ Territorial expansionism into Mexico was characterized by a contentious debate over the perceived advantages and disadvantages of incorporating a people deemed to be so palpably inferior. In the cabinet of the time, Secretary of State James Buchanan often expressed his fear of the admission of any large number of Mexicans to the Union, and in the wake of the 1848 Treaty, one newspaper, the Louisville Democrat, expressed the opinion that the United States had obtained ‘not the best boundary, but all the territory of value that we can get without taking the people’ (quoted in Horsman, 1981: 245-246). Efforts to acquire all of Mexico in the 1846-48 period raised overwhelming racialist objections to having the Mexicans brought into the Union. Although the Mexicans were a neighbouring people known to the people of the United States for generations, they were considered generally unacceptable to Americans as a part of the body politic.‘s It was a widely-held belief throughout the nineteenth century, and particularly before the Civil War, that people who were not capable of self-government should not participate in the governing of Anglo-Saxons. In this context, the later expansion which took place between 1898 and 1916, and which concerned the acquisition of non-contiguous territory inhabited by races considered by the dominant sentiment within the United States to be inferior,i9 was accompanied by an evasion of the American constitutional principle that all citizens of a republic ought to enjoy an equality of rights. In other words, as Weston (1972) has shown in his analysis of the influence of racial assumptions on American foreign policy, the ideology of racial superiority tended to compromise the principles of equality of rights and opportunity, a factor, of course, that also impinged on domestic politics. An international relations theorist recently observed that ‘the alternative worlds destroyed and suppressed within modern cartography become available only when the global map is given historical depth’ (Shapiro, 1994: 483). The US-Mexican War can provide an example of the need to recover such an historical and, one can add, geopolitical depth. Specifically, in the time of NAFTA, and in some dimensions the ‘Miamization of Mexico’, it is clear that today’s US-Mexico relations are frequently marked by a geopolitics of amnesia. A Chicano film producer, Paul Espinoza, is currently preparing a documentary on the US-Mexican War as part of a multi-cultural project to improve the level of understanding in both societies of their interactive geopolitical histories.20 The project has already come under fire from conservative forces in the US Congress, but has received sufficient independent financial support to guarantee broadcasting in the near future, around 150 years since the outbreak of hostilities. It is highly likely that the documentary, supported by a range of Mexican and United States academics and journalists, will resuscitate interest and provoke controversy over the ways in which the historical and geopolitical significance of mid-nineteenth century events can be represented today; it provides a cogent example of the continuing significance of the geopolitics of memory, and can be used as part of a wider project to de-naturalize and desediment given assumptions about border zones and the meanings of territorial sovereignty. Questions of territorial loss and territorial acquisition, and of the history of geopolitical interventions are intrinsic to the US-Mexican encounter, and their recovery as thematic markers can be seen as an expression of a will to understand and rethink the patterns of interactive representation.

**The securitization of “Water wars” epitomize neoliberalism and move away from cuts in consumption**

**Trottier**, Oxford Center for Water Research, University of Oxford, UK, **No Date**

(“Water Wars: The Rise of a Hegemonic Concept,” prepared within the framework of the joint UNESCO–Green Cross International project entitled “From Potential Conflict to Cooperation Potential (PCCP): Water for Peace,” http://webworld.unesco.org/Water/wwap/pccp/cd/pdf/history\_future\_shared\_water\_resources/water\_wars\_hegemonic\_concept.pdf)

Threatening to reduce the water transfers to the Jordanians and Palestinians just as the second Intifada was worsening in intensity certainly brought out the specter of water wars. “The officials responsible for the national water economy are anxiously awaiting the operation of several large water desalination plants scheduled to begin operating within two or three years,” reported the press (Rinat, 2002). Certainly **the specter of water wars should entice taxpayers to foot the very heavy bill for desalination better than the perspective of dried up lawns**.

In Israel, the belief in water wars is now playing a role very similar to that played by **water development in the** United States **in the 1930s**. **Some companies are reaping great benefits from the new desalination policy**. Politicians are benefiting as well and **taxpayers will foot the bill because the hegemonic concepts of water development and water wars lead them to accept this expensive undertaking as legitimate**. In 2001, Mekorot, the Israeli national water company, was hoping to secure the contract for the construction of desalination plants. It therefore emphasized the crisis situation **instead of** promoting **cuts on lawn watering and car washing** (Jerusalem Post, January 23 2001).

**And, more generally their understanding of development relies on Western conceptions of the North/South divide**

**Howard, Hume, and Oslender 07** (\*David Howard – PhD in Latin America Studies from the University of Oxford; he is a lecturer in Sustainable Urban Development at the University of Oxford, \*\*Mo Hume – PhD in Latin American studies from the University of Liverpool; she is a professor of Development and Latin American Politics (Department of Politics) at the University of Glasgow, and \*\*\*Ulrich Oslender – PhD in Hispanic Studies from the University of Glasgow; former research fellow at the University of Glasgow in the Department of Geography, November 2007, “Violence, fear, and development in Latin America: a critical overview”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25548278.pdf) //MD

Others, however, have criticised 'Mrs Brundtland's disenchanted cosmos' and the fact that sustainable development is still based on the capitalisation of nature, expressed through global views on nature and environment by those who rule, instead of through local respect for surrounding landscapes (Visvanathan 1991). And Sachs (1992) argues in his widely read Development Dictionary that notions of ecology are merely reduced to higher efficiency, while a development framework is still accepted as the norm. Visvanathan (1991: 384) calls for an 'explosion of imaginations' as a form of resistance to this dominant economism and essentially violent development framework:

a call echoed by Peet and Watts (1996: 263-8) in their edited collection on 'liberation ecologies', which envisages 'environmental imaginaries' as primary sites of contestation, which are then articulated by social movements that contest normative visions and the 'imperialism of the imaginary'. In many ways, the very notion of development has been radically called into question, as the concept has been linked to neo-colonial intentions of the Global North to intervene in and keep control of the countries in the Global South. For Escobar (1995: 159), dominant development discourse portrays the so-called 'third world' as a space devoid of knowledge, a 'chronic pathological condition', so that the Western scientist ‘like a good doctor, has the moral obligation to intervene in order to cure the diseased (social) body'. This intervention is always a violent one: one that ruptures the cultural fabric, penetrates the colonised body, and inserts a homogeneous developmental reasoning, often extirpating resistant cultural difference. To break this cycle of violent developmentalism, Escobar (1995) calls for an era of 'post-development' as a necessary step for national projects of decolonisation and for the affirmation of truly emancipatory political projects of self-affirmation.

### Environment

**That causes mass wars**

Brzoska 8 (Michael Brzoska, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg; “The securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security,” Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Convention, 2008)

In the literature on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round ‘exceptionalism’ in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards ‘security experts’ (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations – such as more use of arms, force and violence – will gain in importance in the discourse on ‘what to do’. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004 ). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers, thus leading to arms races.

### Water

The logic of neoliberalism turns all of their extinction impacts and perpetuates exclusionary violence

Nhanenge 7 (Jytte Masters @ U South Africa, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT)

There is today an increasing critique of economic development, whether it takes place in the North or in the South. Although the world on average generates more and more wealth, the riches do not appear to "trickle down" to the poor and improve their material well-being. Instead, poverty and economic inequality is growing. Despite the existence of development aid for more than half a century, the Third World seems not to be "catching up" with the First World. Instead, militarism, dictatorship and human repression is multiplied. Since the mid 1970, the critique of global economic activities has intensified due to the escalating deterioration of the natural environment. Modernization, industrialisation and its economic activities have been directly linked to increased scarcity of natural resources and generation of pollution, which increases global temperatures and degrades soils, lands, water, forests and air. The latter threat is of great significance, because without a healthy environment human beings and animals will not be able to survive. Most people believed that modernization of the world would improve material well-being for all. However, faced with its negative side effects and the real threat of extinction, one must conclude that somewhere along the way "progress" went astray. Instead of material plenty, economic development generated a violent, unhealthy and unequal world. It is a world where a small minority live in material luxury, while millions of people live in misery. These poor people are marginalized by the global economic system. They are forced to survive from degraded environments; they live without personal or social security; they live in abject poverty, with hunger, malnutrition and sickness; and they have no possibility to speak up for themselves and demand a fair share of the world's resources. The majority of these people are women, children, traditional peoples, tribal peoples, people of colour and materially poor people (called women and Others). They are, together with nature, dominated by the global system of economic development imposed by the North. It is this scenario, which is the subject of the dissertation. The overall aim is consequently to discuss the unjustified domination of women, Others and nature and to show how the domination of women and Others is interconnected with the domination of nature. A good place to start a discussion about domination of women, Others and nature is to disclose how they disproportionately must carry the negative effects from global economic development. The below discussion is therefore meant to give an idea of the "flip-side" of modernisation. It gives a gloomy picture of what "progress" and its focus on economic growth has meant for women, poor people and the natural environment. The various complex and inter-connected, negative impacts have been ordered into four crises. The categorization is inspired by Paul Ekins and his 1992 book "A new world order; grassroots movements for global change". In it, Ekins argues that humanity is faced with four interlocked crises of unprecedented magnitude. These crises have the potential to destroy whole ecosystems and to extinct the human race. The first crisis is the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, together with the high level of military spending. The second crisis is the increasing number of people afflicted with hunger and poverty. The third crisis is the environmental degradation. Pollution, destruction of ecosystems and extinction of species are increasing at such a rate that the biosphere is under threat. The fourth crisis is repression and denial of fundamental human rights by governments, which prevents people from developing their potential. It is highly likely that one may add more crises to these four, or categorize them differently, however, Ekins's division is suitable for the present purpose. (Ekins 1992: 1).